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Abstract 
  
This paper represents one of the first studies to document the empirical relation between 
capital structure and management confidence. In a unique sample of US firms that have 
existed for over 25 years we find management confidence, as proxied by University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, is highly significant in explaining firm financing 
decisions. When management confidence is higher firms have higher levels of debt. This 
result is robust to different definitions of leverage and confidence as well as different model 
specifications. This confirms the theoretical arguments in behavioural finance that 
overconfident managers will tend to issue more debt. 
 Market-to-book is found to be a significant determinant of capital structure as 
documented by previous studies. It is likely that this is due to market timing rather than 
growth opportunities as the sample of firms used in this study are not expected to be growth 
firms. 
 In addition, this study provides additional evidence that timing of equity issues is not 
persistent as documented by Baker and Wurgler (2002). The lack of significance in 
persistence of timing of equity issues in the sample of firms indirectly supports the results of 
Hovakimian (2005), that the measure is a proxy for growth opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Corporate capital structure remains a controversial issue in modern corporate finance.  
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a plethora of research has been 
undertaken in attempting to identify the determinants of capital structure. Traditionally, this 
has revolved around agency costs, asymmetric information and transaction cost issues.  
 Recently, behavioral finance has begun to take a more prominent position in 
attempting to explain aspects of finance that traditional research has failed to explain. For 
example, classical finance theory leaves no role for investor sentiment in stock returns. A 
perusal of articles forthcoming in the Journal of Finance provides ample evidence of the 
important impact that behavioral finance is having on mainstream research in finance.   
 The purpose of this paper is to add to the growing body of research in behavioral 
finance and to provide additional empirical support to traditional capital structure research 
by considering the impact of management confidence on capital structure decisions. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the major traditional determinants of 
capital structure and introduces the hypothesized impact that management confidence has on 
capital structure. Section 3 describes the method and data and section 4 documents the 
results. Section 5 provides conclusions.   
 
2. Capital structure determinants and variable definitions 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) are widely regarded as the pioneers in modeling the 
relevance of capital structure to firm value. Since then the debate has progressed from 
theoretical modeling to practical reality. It is recognized that by relaxing the assumptions of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure is relevant to firm value. These assumptions 
generally relate to firm characteristics such as firm size, growth opportunities, collateral 
value of assets and profitability. The empirical evidence on the impact of these 
characteristics is mixed (Hovakimian, 2005).  Generally, the relation firm characteristics 
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have to capital structure is consistent with tradeoff theories.1 However, the tradeoff theories 
are not universally accepted. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) report that a simple pecking 
order model outperforms the target adjustment model in explaining the time-series variation 
in capital structure. 
Typically, many of the existing empirical studies rely on firm fundamental 
characteristics in explaining capital structures, largely ignoring the possible role that 
individual managers may play in capital structure choice. Interestingly, management 
influence on investment decisions has been researched quite extensively. The seminal work 
in this area is Roll (1986). Although a considerable amount of research has been done on 
management influence on investment decisions, very little has been done until recently on 
management influence on financing decisions.   
Roll (1986) uses CEO overconfidence to explain why many mergers are ex-post 
value destroying. Roll’s hubris hypothesis argues that managers are too optimistic about the 
performance of their acquisitions as they overestimate the benefits of the takeover. This 
leads to excessively high bids for targets and in turn ex-post loss making takeovers. 
Malmendier and Tate (2003) show that overconfident CEOs are more likely than rational 
CEOs to undertake value-destroying acquisitions. The issue of overconfidence and the 
impact it has on investment decision making is reviewed in Englmaier (2004). 
From a financing and capital structure perspective, Hackbarth (2004) shows 
theoretically that overconfident managers choose higher debt levels and tend to time capital 
structure decisions. Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed 392 CFOs and found that recent 
stock price performance is the third most popular reason for equity issuance decisions.2 
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) document empirically that managers are more likely to 
                                               
1 See, for example Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hovakimian (2005). 
 
2 Interestingly, the second most important issue is the amount by which the stock is undervalued or overvalued 
by the market. The most important issue is earnings per share dilution. 
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issue equity when their stock market values are higher than book and past market values.3 In 
other words managers time the market when making capital structure decisions.  However, 
whether capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity 
market, and the persistence of market timing has been debated by Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
Hovakimian (2005) and Alti (2006). Irrespective, both Baker and Wurgler (2002) and 
Hovakimian (2005) find a significant negative relation between leverage and market-to-
book. This provides support for a market timing effect- that managers’ beliefs about stock 
prices may influence their decisions about issuing debt or equity. An alternative view is that 
this relation is driven by growth opportunities (Hovakimian, 2005). 
 In relation to confidence and stock returns, considerable research has been 
conducted.  Neal and Wheatley (1998) examine the forecast power of three measures of 
individual confidence or sentiment.  They find some evidence of predictability of stock 
returns, particularly for small firms. Brown and Cliff (2005) find strong and consistent 
support for the hypothesis that asset values are affected by investor sentiment.  Charoenrook 
(2005) also finds predictability in consumer confidence or sentiment and stock returns. 
Therefore, if there is a relation between equity values and capital structure, and market 
confidence and equity values, what effect does management confidence have on capital 
structure?  To explore this relation further we need to consider management decision making 
with overconfident managers. 
  
2.1 Overconfidence 
Psychologists have determined that overconfidence causes people to overestimate their 
knowledge, underestimate their risks and exaggerate their ability to control events 
(Nofsinger, 2003). There are numerous examples of overconfidence. For a good review see 
Englmaier (2004).  
                                               
3 This follows from Myers and Majluf (1984) and asymmetric information between management and investors. 
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Psychologists believe that emotions and moods that are not related to the decision at 
hand can exert influence on that decision. Nofsinger (2003) suggests that the general level of 
optimism/pessimism in society affects financial decision-makers’ mood and can lead to 
market wide phenomenon. Optimism (and overconfidence) leads corporate managers to 
make corporate investment, use more debt financing, and conduct more acquisitions. 
Hackbarth (2004) also shows theoretically that overoptimistic and/or overconfident 
managers choose higher debt levels and issue new debt more often. An optimistic society is 
more willing to take on additional debt and increase spending. However, little empirical 
research is available to determine if a relation exists between management confidence and 
capital structure. 
 
3. Method and Data 
3.1 Method 
The ordinary least squares regression of leverage with robust t-statistics reflecting standard 
errors adjusted for Heteroscedasticity is: 4 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
LEVERAGE CONF MB EFWAMB
SIZE TNG PRF
a a a a
a a a e
- - -
- - -
= + + +
+ + + +
   (1) 
This follows Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Hovakimian (2005) amongst others. 
Leverage for firm i at time t, is defined as: 
, ,
,
,
    
 
i t i t
i t
i t
Long term debt Short term debt
LEVERAGE
Total assets
+
= . 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) discuss the pros and cons of various leverage measures. We 
consider the impact of alternative proxies on the results later in the paper. 
 The independent variables used in equation (1) are as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Different specifications and tests of equation (1) and different definitions of the dependent and independent 
variables are considered later in the paper.  
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3.1.1Management confidence (CONF) 
There are many measures of sentiment. For example, Neal and Wheatley (1998) consider 
discounts on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases and net mutual fund 
redemptions to reflect individual investor confidence. Brown and Cliff (2005) use data from 
Investor’s Intelligence, which tracks the number of market newsletters that are bullish, 
bearish or neutral and the bull-bear spread as measures of confidence. Generally, these 
measures are not available over a sufficient period for meaningful results from equation (1) 
to be obtained. 
 We proxy management confidence (CONF) as the average of the past 12 months 
Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) from the University of Michigan from 1978 to 2004. This 
measure of confidence is based on a direct survey of public perceptions about current and 
expected economic conditions, and it has a sufficiently long time period for meaningful 
results to be obtained. The monthly CSI is based on an ongoing nationally representative 
survey based on approximately 500 telephone interviews with adult men and women living 
in households in the coterminous United States (48 States plus the District of Columbia).  
The sample is designed to maximize the study of change by incorporating a rotating panel 
sample design in an ongoing monthly survey program.  For each monthly sample, an 
independent cross-section sample of households is drawn.  The respondents chosen in this 
drawing are then re-interviewed six months later.  A rotating panel design results, and the 
total sample for any one survey is normally made up of 60% new respondents, and 40% 
being interviewed for the second time.  
 The CSI is an average of scores from five survey questions that ask respondents 
about their current financial situations; the expected change in their financial situations over 
the next year; their views on expected business conditions in the next year and the next five 
years; and whether they think this is a good time or a bad time to make big-ticket household 
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purchases. The actual survey questions and construction method of the index are presented 
in Appendix 1. 
 For a half-century, the CSI has consistently outperformed other measures in 
anticipating changes in the GDP six to nine months before they occur (Weiss, 2003). Qiu 
and Welch (2005) find it the only good measure of UBS/Gallup investor sentiment.5 
Virtually all published academic research on consumer sentiment focuses on the CSI 
(Charoenrook, 2003). Furthermore, the US federal government has included it among its 
leading economic indicators since 1989 (Weiss, 2003). We consider the CSI to be a suitable 
proxy for US management confidence or sentiment. 
  
3.1.2 Market-to-book (MB) 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) document that market-to-book affects leverage.  Generally, firms 
are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book values and 
repurchase equity when their market values are low. Market-to-book is defined as: 
.
i,t i,t i,t
i t
i,t
Total assets - book equity +market equity
MB
Total assets
=  
 
However, market-to-book is also a common measure for growth opportunities (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995).  Therefore, market-to-book can be regarded as a proxy for growth 
opportunities and market timing. However, if firms that are less likely to have growth 
opportunities have a significant coefficient on MB then it could be concluded that market-to-
book is evidence of market timing not growth opportunities. Firms less likely to have growth 
opportunities are older more established firms. 
 
 
                                               
5 UBS/Gallup investor sentiment index is only available from 1996. 
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3.1.2 External Finance Weighted Average Market-to-Book (EFWAMB) 
External-finance-weighted-average-market-to-book has been used by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) to measure the persistence of long-past market to book ratios.  Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) contend that a negative relation on this variable occurs because firms do not 
subsequently adjust their leverage towards the target, the changes in leverage induced by 
equity market timing persist. As a result long-past market to book ratios have a negative 
effect on current debt ratios. It is defined as: 
1
, ,1
1
1
( )  
( )
t
s s
i t i st
s
r r
r
e dEFWAMB x MB
e d
-
-
=
=
+
=
+
å
å
 
where e and d  denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. Net equity issued is 
defined as: 
,
i,t i,t -1 i,t i,t -1
i t
i,t
(Book equity - book equity ) - (retained earnings - retained earnings )
e
Total assets
=  
Net debt issued is defined as: 
,
)i,t i,t i,t -1 i,t i,t -1
i t
i,t
Total assets - (bookequity - book equity ) -(retained earnings - retained earnings
d
Total assets
é ùë û=
 
Hovakimian (2005) argues that EFWAMB is a proxy for growth opportunities, as has been 
suggested for market-to-book, rather than a measure of market timing persistence. If 
EFWAMB is a proxy for growth opportunities then we would expect EFWAMB for older 
more established firms to be not significantly related to leverage. If EFWAMB is 
significantly related to leverage for older more established firms (ie non growth firms) then 
it could be concluded that market timing is persistent. 
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3.1.3 Firm Size (SIZE) 
 Firm size has been found to be a positive determinant of capital structure (Agrawal 
and Nagarajan, 1990; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Hovakimian, 2005).  Firm size may be a 
proxy for numerous variables such as lower transaction costs in issuing debt, greater access 
to debt markets and lower information asymmetries.  The natural logarithm of total sales is 
commonly considered a proxy for the size of each firm: 
 , (  )i t i,tSIZE Ln Total sales= . 
 
3.1.4 Tangibility of Assets (TNG) 
 The collateral value of assets, or tangibility of assets, held by a firm has found to be a 
determinant of leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  Firms with higher tangible assets are 
expected to have higher leverage.  Tangible assets are likely to have an impact on the 
borrowing decisions of a firm because they are less subject to informational asymmetries and 
usually they have a greater value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. Additionally, 
the moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral, because 
this constitutes a positive signal to the debt holders.   
Following Hovakimian (2005) we define the collateral value of assets for each firm 
as:  
  = 
 
i,t
i,t
i,t
Property plant and equipment
TNG
Total assets
   
 
3.1.5 Firm Profitability (PRF) 
 Myers (1984) pecking order theory of capital structure shows that if a firm is 
profitable then it is more likely that financing would be from internal sources rather than 
external sources. More profitable firms are expected to hold less debt, since it is easier and 
more cost effective to finance internally.  
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The variable chosen to measure profitability for each firm follows Baker and 
Wurgler (2002): 
 ,
i,t
i t
i,t
Earnings before interest, tax and depreciation
PRF
Total assets
=      
 
3.2 Data 
The Osiris database was searched for the largest 500 US industrial companies on total assets 
as of 2004. Since the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index was readily available from 1978 
this began the starting year. The Compustat files were searched for the top 500 companies 
that existed in 1978 and continued to exist until 2004. These companies made up the final 
common sample of 229 companies and 5,508 firm years.6 These companies represented the 
largest and longest surviving firms in the US over the past 27 years. They represent 
relatively lower growth firms given their long history. 
 Summary statistics for these firms are provided in Table 1. 
  [TABLE 1 HERE] 
 These statistics are comparable to those reported in Hovakimian (2005). However, the firms 
in our sample are those that have existed across the whole sample period. They are survivors, 
at least from 1978 through 2004.  
 The average value of management confidence over the sample period is 
approximately 90. The maximum of 107.6 occurred in the year 2000 and the minimum of 
64.4 occurred in 1980. A graph of CONF and the average annual value of LEVERAGE from 
1978 to 2004 is shown in Figure 1.7 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
                                               
6 229 firms for 27 years is 6,183. There were 666 observations where data for a specific variable in equation (1) 
was not available on Compustat. Nine observations were deleted where LEVERAGE was in excess of 100%. 
 
7 There are 229 firms in the sample, the CONF variable is set to be the same for each firm in any given year. 
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 Comparing Table 1 to Hovakimian (2005) firms in our sample have higher leverage, 
are larger in size, have higher tangible assets and are more profitable than the sample used 
by Hovakimian (2005). As we expect for our sample of well established, relatively lower 
growth firms firms, they have a lower average market-to-book (1.35 v 1.54) and a lower 
external finance weighted average market to book (1.28 v 1.63) than the firms in 
Hovakimian (2005).  
 On average the sample of our firms have approximately 30% leverage. The 
maximum value of leverage is 100%.  
 Tangible assets averaged about 50% of total assets, and total assets provided an 
average of 14% per annum return.   
 A Jacques-Bera test for normality rejected the null of normality in the distribution for 
each variable, except SIZE. This is expected given the construction of this variable.8 
 Table 2 reports results of correlation between variables. As shown in Table 2 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major concern. The variable MB has a relatively high 
positive correlation with PRF (0.524) and a relatively high negative correlation with TNG (-
0.417). The regression equation (1) was conducted excluding MB and the significance of the 
other coefficients remained similar to those reported.9  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 A test for normality on the 27 values of CONF for each year failed to reject the null of normality. 
  
9 A redundant variables test was conducted on MB. The log-likelihood ratio is 68.4 indicating MB is highly 
significant. 
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4. Results 
The results of regression equation (1) are shown in Table 3. The regression of equation (1) is 
highly significant with an adjusted R2 of 25%. This compares with an R2 of 17.6% in 
Hovakimian(2005). 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 The coefficient on the variable CONF is positive and significant. This indicates that 
when our proxy for management confidence is higher, firms have higher leverage.10 This 
supports the notion that optimism (and overconfidence) causes managers to overestimate the 
probability of success and underestimate the risk of the decision outcomes. This leads 
corporate managers to use more debt financing. An optimistic society is more willing to take 
on additional debt and increase spending.  
 The coefficient on market-to-book is negative indicating that when market values are 
relatively high leverage is low. This supports the market timing results of Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) and Hovakimian (2005).  
 Interestingly, the external finance equally weighted market to book variable 
(EFWAMB) is not significant.   Baker and Wurgler (2002) contend that the significant 
negative relation between EFWAMB and leverage that they find is because firms do not 
subsequently adjust their leverage towards the target after market timing. The changes in 
leverage induced by equity market timing persist. As a result, long-past market-to-book 
ratios have a negative effect on current debt ratios.  The results in Table 3 for the coefficient 
on EFWAMB do not provide evidence of persistence in equity market timing. Hovakimian 
(2005) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) find a significant negative relation between EFWAMB 
and Leverage. However, Hovakimian (2005) contends that the negative relation is not due to 
persistence in market timing but due to effects of growth opportunities. 
                                               
10 Note that the proxy for management confidence is lagged one period in equation (1). 
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 Hovakimian (2005) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) consider both non-IPO and IPO 
firms. A possible reason for the insignificance in our results is that our sample is comprised 
of all firms that existed from 1978 to 2004, there are no IPO firms, unless they listed in 
1978, which is unlikely to be a large number. Therefore, the insignificant coefficient on 
EFWAMB is evidence that market timing does not persist and the significant coefficients 
documented by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Hovakimian (2005) are more likely due to 
growth opportunities. 
 The three main control variables (size, tangibility of assets and profitability) all show 
as having highly significant coefficients. Firms that are larger are significantly positively 
correlated with higher leverage. This supports the hypotheses that these firms have lower 
transaction costs in issuing debt, greater access to debt markets and lower information 
asymmetries.   
 Firms with higher tangibility of assets have a positive correlation with leverage. This 
supports the hypothesis that these firms are likely to have relatively lower information 
asymmetries, lower bankruptcy risk and moral hazard risks. 
 More profitable firms are correlated with less leverage. This supports the pecking 
order theory of capital structure. 
 
4.1 Robustness tests 
The first test of robustness is to consider the impact of different specifications of 
LEVERAGE. The definition of leverage used in equation (1) is based on book values. An 
alternative specification is to base leverage on market values, particularly market value of 
equity. Leverage is redefined as: 
, ,
,
, ,
    
 
(     )    
i t i t
i t
i t i t
Long term debt Short term debt
MKT LEVERAGE
Long term debt Short term debt Market value of equity
+
=
+ +
 
This measure of leverage is applied as the dependent variable in equation (1). The results are 
consistent with those previously reported. 
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 The variable LEVERAGE (and MKT LEVERAGE) can only take on values between 
zero and one. A firm with zero leverage indicates that it is all-equity financed and a firm 
with leverage of 1 indicates it is all-debt financed, technically bankrupt. The regression 
equation (1) was re-run using a Censored Normal (TOBIT) regression. The results using 
either definition of leverage were consistent as those previously reported. 
 Also the regression equation (1) was re-defined as: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 . 1 ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
LEVERAGE CONF MB EFWAMB
SIZE TNG PRF LEVERAGE
a a a a
a a a a e
- - -
- - - -
D = + + +
+ + + + +
  (2) 
Where ΔLEVERAGEi,t is defined as the change in LEVERAGE from t to t-1. The other 
variables are as previously defined. 
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that a lagged value of LEVERAGE is required in 
equation (2) as leverage is bounded between zero and one. When leverage is near one of 
these boundaries, the change in leverage can only go in one direction, regardless of the 
values of the other variables. Not controlling for lagged leverage may obscure the effects of 
the other variables.  Specifically, the purpose of equation (2) is to identify the impact of the 
independent variables on current financing decisions. The results of this regression are 
shown in Table 4. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
The variable CONF remains significant as does MB. This suggests that confidence and 
market-to-book ratio is significantly related to current financing decisions. This means that 
the level of confidence and market-to-book have a significant effect on incremental 
decisions to change the current capital structure even after controlling for pre-decision 
leverage and other relevant factors.   
 The results in Table 4 on the control variables are quite different from Hovakimian 
(2005, Table 7).  Firm size is now insignificant as is profitability. EFWAMB also remain 
insignificant. To ascertain if CONF is driving these results, regression equation (2) was run 
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excluding CONF. The results become remarkably similar to Hovakimian (2005), except for 
EFWAMB which remains insignificant. These results further support the conclusion that 
EFWAMB is a proxy for growth and not persistence in market timing. This also further 
supports the conclusion that management confidence is a significant variable in capital 
structure choice. 
 The proxy for management confidence was re-defined as the measure of the 
Consumer Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan as at January of each of the 
years 1978 to 2004 as well as at December of the years 1978 to 2004, rather than the 
monthly average for the year. In both cases the coefficient on CONF in equation (1) remains 
highly significant. 
 Considering Figure 1, it is apparent that there is a general upward trend in CSI. 
LEVERAGE also appears to have a slight upward trend. Therefore, the positive significance 
of CONF may be just indicating that both leverage and confidence have increased over time.  
To assess the impact of time, a time variable was included in equation (1).  Although the 
time variable is significant, the confidence variable remains positive and highly significant.  
 Market-to-book was redefined as: 
.
i,t
i t
i,t
Market equity
MB
Book equity
=  
This measure of market-to-book is applied in equation (1). The results are consistent with 
those previously reported. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper represents one of the first studies to document an empirical relation between 
capital structure and confidence or sentiment. In a unique sample of US firms that have 
existed for over 25 years we find that management confidence as proxied by the University 
of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is pervasive and highly significant in explaining 
firm financing decisions. When confidence is higher firms have higher levels of debt. This 
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result is robust to different regression models and different specifications, as well as 
different definitions of leverage and confidence. This supports the theoretical arguments in 
behavioural finance that overconfident managers tend to issue more debt. 
 Market-to-book is found to be a significant determinant of capital structure as 
documented by previous studies. It is likely that this is due to market timing rather than 
growth opportunities as the sample of firms used in this study are not expected to be growth 
firms. 
 This study also provides additional evidence that timing of equity issues is not 
persistent as documented by Baker and Wurgler (2002). The lack of significance in 
persistence of timing of equity issues in the sample of firms indirectly supports the results of 
Hovakimian (2005), that the measure is a proxy for growth opportunities. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of sample variables 
This table reports variable descriptive statistics of the sample variables for: 
 
, ,
,
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L ong term debt Short term debt
L E VE RA G E
T otal assets
+
=  
SENTi,t = Average of the past 12 months Consumer Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan. 
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where e and d  denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. Net equity issued is defined as: 
,
i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
( B o o k  e q u i ty - b o o k  e q u i ty ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s )
e
T o ta l  a s s e t s
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Net debt issued is defined as: 
,
)i ,t i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
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i ,t
T o ta l  a s s e t s - (b o o k e q u i t y - b o o k  e q u i t y ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s
d
T o ta l  a s s e t s
é ùë û=
 
. 1i t
Total assets - book equity + market equityMB
Total assets-
=  
 
, (  )i t i ,tS I Z E L n T o t a l s a l e s=  
 = 
 
i,t
i,t
i,t
Property plant and  equipment
TNG
Total assets
 
,
i,t
i t
Earnings before interest, tax and  depreciation
PRF
Total assets
=  
 
 
 LEVERAGE SENT MB EFWAMB SIZE TNG PRF 
 Mean 0.29 89.29 1.35 1.28 7.24 0.47 0.14 
 Median 0.31 92.20 1.14 1.08 7.24 0.43 0.13 
 Maximum 1.64 107.60 8.98 101.87 11.93 0.96 0.69 
 Minimum 0.00 64.40 0.60 -118.84 2.00 0.00 -0.40 
 Std. Dev. 0.16 11.09 0.64 3.02 1.41 0.26 0.06 
 Observations 5,517 
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Figure 1 
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficients 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients for the regression variables: 
 
, ,
,
,
    
 
i t i t
i t
i t
L ong term debt Short term debt
L E VE RA G E
T otal assets
+
=  
SENTi,t = Average of the past 12 months Consumer Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan. 
. 1i t
Total assets - book equity + market equityMB
Total assets-
=  
 
1
, ,1
1
1
( )  
( )
t
s s
i t i st
s
r r
r
e dE F W A M B x M B
e d
-
-
=
=
+
=
+
å
å
  
where e and d  denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. Net equity issued is defined as: 
,
i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
( B o o k  e q u i ty - b o o k  e q u i ty ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s )
e
T o ta l  a s s e t s
=  
Net debt issued is defined as: 
,
)i ,t i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
T o ta l  a s s e t s - (b o o k e q u i t y - b o o k  e q u i t y ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s
d
T o ta l  a s s e t s
é ùë û=
 
, (  )i t i ,tS I Z E L n T o t a l s a l e s=  
 =  
 
i,t
i,t
i,t
P roperty p lant and  equipm ent
T N G
T otal assets
 
,
i ,t
i t
E a r n in g s  b e fo re  in te re s t , ta x  a n d  d e p r ec ia tio n
P R F
T o ta l  a ss e ts
=  
 
 
 
 LEVERAGE SENT MB EFWAMB SIZE TNG 
LEVERAGE       
SENT 0.001      
MB -0.390 0.151     
EFWAMB -0.070 0.014 0.128    
SIZE 0.007 0.221 0.052 0.004   
TNG 0.386 -0.110 -0.417 -0.085 -0.123  
PRF -0.376 0.015 0.524 0.057 -0.002 -0.120 
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Table 3 
Capital structure determinants 
This table reports the results of the following pooled cross-sectional time series regression (Equation 1) on the 
full sample of 229 US firms from 1978 until 2004: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
L E V E R A G E S E N T M B E F W A M B
S IZ E T N G P R F
a a a a
a a a e
- - -
- - -
= + + +
+ + + +
   (1) 
 
where 
, ,
,
,
    
 
i t i t
i t
i t
L ong term debt Short term debt
L E VE RA G E
T otal assets
+
=  
 
SENTi,t = Average of the past 12 months Consumer Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan. 
. 1i t
Total assets - book equity + market equityMB
Total assets-
=  
1
, ,1
1
1
( )  
( )
t
s s
i t i st
s
r r
r
e dE F W A M B x M B
e d
-
-
=
=
+
=
+
å
å
  
where e and d  denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. Net equity issued is defined as: 
,
i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
( B o o k  e q u i ty - b o o k  e q u i ty ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s )
e
T o ta l  a s s e t s
=  
Net debt issued is defined as: 
,
)i ,t i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
T o ta l  a s s e t s - (b o o k e q u i t y - b o o k  e q u i t y ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s
d
T o ta l  a s s e t s
é ùë û=
 
, (  )i t i ,tS I Z E L n T o t a l s a l e s=  
 =  
 
i ,t
i ,t
i ,t
P r o p e r ty  p la n t  a n d  e q u ip m e n t
T N G
T o ta l a s s e t s
 
,
i ,t
i t
E a r n in g s  b e fo re  in te re s t , ta x  a n d  d e p r ec ia tio n
P R F
T o ta l  a ss e ts
=  
 
Sample t-statistics are White (1980) adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.172 8.894 0.000 
SENT 0.001 8.341 0.000 
MB -0.032 -7.829 0.000 
EFWAMB -0.001 -1.223 0.221 
SIZE 0.004 3.106 0.002 
TNG 0.193 24.893 0.000 
PRF -0.597 -10.959 0.000 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.250   
    F-statistic 295.796   
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   
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Table 4 
 
This table reports the results of the following pooled cross-sectional time series regression (Equation 2) on the 
full sample of 229 US firms from 1978 until 2004: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
L E V E R A G E S E N T M B E F W A M B
S I Z E T N G P R F L E V E R A G E
a a a a
a a a a e
- - -
- - - -
D = + + +
+ + + + +
  (2) 
 
where 
, , , 1 , 1
,
, , 1
        
  
i t i t i t i t
i t
i t i t
Long term debt Short term debt Long term debt Short term debt
LEVERAGE
Total assets Total assets
- -
-
æ ö æ ö+ +
D = -ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
 
SENTi,t = Average of the past 12 months Consumer Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan. 
. 1i t
Total assets - book equity + market equityMB
Total assets-
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1
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=
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where e and d  denote net equity and net debt issued, respectively. Net equity issued is defined as: 
,
i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
( B o o k  e q u i ty - b o o k  e q u i ty ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s )
e
T o ta l  a s s e t s
=  
Net debt issued is defined as: 
,
)i ,t i ,t i ,t - 1 i ,t i ,t - 1
i t
i ,t
T o ta l  a s s e t s - (b o o k e q u i t y - b o o k  e q u i t y ) - ( r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s - r e ta in e d  e a r n in g s
d
T o ta l  a s s e t s
é ùë û=
 
, (  )i t i ,tS I Z E L n T o t a l s a l e s=  
 =  
 
i ,t
i ,t
i , t
P r o p e r t y  p l a n t  a n d  e q u i p m e n t
T N G
T o t a l a s s e t s
 
,
i ,t
i t
E a r n in g s  b e fo r e  i n t e r e s t , t a x  a n d  d e p r e c ia t i o n
P R F
T o ta l  a s s e t s
=  
Sample t-statistics are White (1980) adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
    
C -0.041 -4.151 0.000 
SENT 0.001 8.322 0.000 
MB -0.005 -2.339 0.019 
EFWAMB 0.000 -0.427 0.670 
SIZE 0.000 0.239 0.811 
TNG 0.022 5.048 0.000 
PRF 0.025 0.937 0.349 
LEVERAGEt-1 -0.117 -7.996 0.000 
    
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.069   
    F-statistic 57.216   
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000   
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Appendix 1 
Historical data for the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index are available at 
http://www.athena.sca.isr.emich.edu and http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/. The procedure used to 
calculate the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) as described in 
www.athena.sca.isr.umich.edu, Howrey (2001) and Charoenrook (2003). 
 
To calculate the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), first compute the relative scores (the 
percent giving favorable replies minus the percent giving unfavorable replies, plus 100) for 
each of the five index questions. Round each relative score to the nearest whole number. 
Using the formula shown below, sum the five relative scores; divide by the 1966 base period 
total of 6.7558; and add 2.0 (a constant to correct for sample design changes since the 
1950s).  
1 2 3 4 5 2.0
6.7558
COM COM COM COM COMICS + + + += +   
COM denotes the components of the index.  
COM1 =“We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would 
you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than 
you were a year ago?”  
COM2 = “Now, looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family 
living there) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?”  
COM3 = “Now, turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that 
during the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?”  
COM4 = “Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a 
whole we’ll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will 
have periods of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?”  
COM5 = “About the big things people buy for their homes—such as furniture, a refrigerator, 
stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a 
bad time for people to buy major household items?”  
 
 
